

## II.—History and Tragedy

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Aristotle's distinction between tragedy (which imitates actions to arouse emotions) and history (which states facts) was ignored by historians, who, influenced by Isocrates, wrote tragical histories. Polybius opposed, though admitting the difficulty of keeping tragedy out of particular histories (monographs). He himself wrote one on the Numantine War and his friend Scipio. This explains Cicero's request to Lucceius for a monograph on his consulship, which involved tragic elements. The request does not contradict Cicero's statement that truth is the first law of history. A parallel is Pollio's history of the Civil War (Hor. *Carm.* 2.1).

In his *Poetics* Aristotle indicates that imitation is an essential feature of poetry as of some other arts.<sup>1</sup> Treatises on medicine or physics, even when in verse form, are not poetry because they do not imitate.<sup>2</sup> Though Aristotle does not say so, it is to be inferred that such treatises and others like them set forth facts or theories. The reader naturally asks what it is that the poet imitates. Aristotle promptly answers the unspoken question by saying that poets imitate the actions of men, or men in action.<sup>3</sup> Tragedy, he continues, imitates a complete action having some magnitude. Through pity and fear it produces a catharsis of these emotions. Action or plot is the most essential element in tragedy.<sup>4</sup>

The distinction between the historian and the poet, Aristotle continues, is not that the former writes prose and the latter verse, but that one tells what happened, the other what might happen. Herodotus in verse form would still not be poetry. History deals with particulars, poetry with universals, by which is meant what sort of person probably or necessarily will say or do what sort of thing. After some further observations Aristotle states that it is clear from these facts that the poet must be the poet (i.e., creator) of his plots (or actions) rather than of his verses, for he is a poet as a result of imitation, and his imitation is one of actions.<sup>5</sup> This remark refers to the difference just pointed out between history and

<sup>1</sup> 1.1447a17.

<sup>2</sup> 1.1447b16.

<sup>3</sup> 2.1448a1.

<sup>4</sup> 6.1449b27; 1450a15ff.

<sup>5</sup> 9.1451b27.

tragedy, as Gudeman notes. It is clearly implied that history does not imitate action. From what Aristotle had said about treatises on medicine and physics it is obvious that in his view history sets forth facts and does not imitate actions, i.e., it does not make up plots. If, continues Aristotle, the poet puts into poetry things that actually happened (as a historian does), he is a poet just the same, for some things that actually happened might happen. Truth is not always stranger than fiction, we might paraphrase, but occasionally is as true as fiction. But tragedy, Aristotle resumes, is an imitation not only of a complete action (as he had already said) but also of things involving or producing fear and pity. Imitation in itself arouses the emotions, as Ross infers from a comparison of the *Poetics* with a passage in the *Politics*.<sup>6</sup> History, therefore, not only is no imitation, but, it is fair for us to infer, should not arouse fear and pity.<sup>7</sup> This point is of importance for certain views expressed below.

Things involving fear and pity, Aristotle says, make the greatest impression if they happen unexpectedly (*παρὰ τὴν δόξαν*), for they are more marvelous (*θαυμαστόν*).<sup>8</sup> A reversal of fortune (*περιπέτεια*) is the change (*μεταβολή*) to the opposite of the previous action.<sup>9</sup> Pitiful and fearful situations are better produced by the structure of the story than by actual scenes on the stage. But those who through such scenes produce not fear but mere sensationalism (*τερατῶδες*) have nothing to do with tragedy.<sup>10</sup> The tragic poet must produce a pleasurable feeling from pity and fear through imitation. Some incidents are terrible (*δεινά*), some pitiful.

To summarize the difference between history and tragedy as stated by Aristotle either explicitly or inferentially, tragedy imitates the actions of men, history states facts; the purpose of tragedy is to arouse fear and pity, especially through the unexpected and through change of fortune, but history has no such purpose; tragedy deals with a complete action, having a beginning, middle, and end, history does not necessarily do so. The process which Aristotle

<sup>6</sup> W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*<sup>3</sup> (London, 1937) 278.

<sup>7</sup> Nor has history anything to do with complete action having a beginning, middle, and end, for it does not set forth an action but a period in which there are unrelated happenings (23.1459a21).

<sup>8</sup> 9.1452a4; cf. 24.1460a12. For *θαυμαστόν* and *τέρας* cf. Gudeman on 14.1453b9. Isolated Greek words are usually quoted because they occur again and again and form a kind of *leitmotiv*.

<sup>9</sup> 11.1452a22. For *περιπέτεια* as a technical term cf. Gudeman on 6.1450a34, 10.1452a15.

<sup>10</sup> 14.1453b1.

favors in a tragedy is this: terrible things should produce fear or pity for the purpose of catharsis; he opposes sensationalism which fails to produce fear and the resultant catharsis.

The words of Aristotle may have been the starting-point for opposing attitudes about history and its relation to tragedy which are traceable through Greek and Latin literature and no doubt far beyond. As is apparent from Aristotle, it is part of the larger problem of the difference between history and poetry. Some thought of this difference as one between fact and fiction, others felt that history could profitably employ the devices of poetry, even to deviating from exact truth. I shall not attempt to trace the history of this larger question but shall content myself with a survey of the influence of tragedy on history, and more particularly with the theory of such influence.

The tendency to deviate from strict truth in the interest of a good story is of course sufficient to explain the historians who failed to keep to the highest standards of truthfulness. We must remember, too, that early Greek history was genealogical and mythological and that even Herodotus was influenced by epic poetry, the source of the stories of tragedy; *per contra* tragedy sometimes drew on history. It is interesting to note that Herodotus in his history and Aeschylus in his *Persians* both dealt with the Persian invasion. It has even been suggested that in his later books Herodotus was influenced by the tragedies of Phrynichus and Aeschylus.<sup>11</sup> We recall, too, that the speeches, so constant a feature of Greek and Roman histories, are essentially a dramatic device.<sup>12</sup>

Other factors played a part in blurring the line between truth and fiction, as, for example, rhetoric. Here we think primarily of Isocrates. It is even conceivable that Aristotle had Isocrates in mind when he discussed the difference between history and tragedy; that is, he may have been attacking Isocrates' views by innuendo.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> J. B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians* (New York, 1909) 33, 68.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Bury, *op. cit.* 116ff. F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London, 1907) 137ff., certainly goes too far in seeing a relation between history and tragedy, but his point of view cannot be ignored (cf. Bury, 124). His view is supported by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*De Thuc.* 15; see note 110). Cf. too John H. Finley, Jr., *Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass., 1942) 321ff.

<sup>13</sup> That Isocrates criticized Aristotle after the latter started teaching rhetoric is known and that Aristotle responded in kind is traditional and likely. Cf. too F. Dümmler, "Zu den historischen Arbeiten der ältesten Peripatetiker," *RhM* 42 (1887) 179.

Unfortunately for our purpose, Aristotle in the *Poetics* is discussing how tragedy should differ from history rather than how history should be unlike tragedy.<sup>14</sup> In any case, Isocrates' influence led to the introduction of rhetorical and poetic effects and devices into historical prose.<sup>15</sup> He himself, in dealing with historical events, gives prominence to the calamities suffered by the Greeks and reproaches those who think it quite proper to shed tears over the misfortunes invented by the poets (i.e., the tragedians) but have no pity for many terrible sufferings that actually happened.<sup>16</sup> It is clear from Isocrates' speeches that, if he had written history, he might have been under the influence of epic and tragedy. He complains, for example, that some who lived at the time of the Trojan War have been honored in songs and tragedies, whereas contemporaries receive no such honor.<sup>17</sup> He proceeds to make up for this deficiency in a eulogistic biography of Evagoras. He points out that poets invent details about the return of great men to their countries but that the truth about the terrible and fearful (*δεινὸς καὶ φοβερός*) dangers incurred by Evagoras surpasses these.<sup>18</sup> But this king was unlike the heroes of epic and tragedy in that he lived happily ever afterward, whereas most of them succumbed to misfortune.<sup>19</sup> Late in life Isocrates denied having introduced sensationalism (*τραπείλας*) and falsehood into his work.<sup>20</sup> Still, in a long *praeteritio* in the same speech he mentions the terrible deeds that disgrace the history of Greek cities other than Athens, the murder

<sup>14</sup> Perhaps the Peripatetic Praxiphanes developed Aristotle's ideas about history. R. Hirzel, "Die Thukydideslegende," *H* 13 (1878) 46, has made it seem probable that Praxiphanes' *περὶ ἱστορίας* was a dialogue and that Thucydides was one of the speakers along with a number of poets, including the tragic poet Agathon. Praxiphanes may well have discussed the appropriate character of history as distinguished from tragedy and other poetic genres.

<sup>15</sup> For a possible criticism of Isocrates' influence on historians see below on Polybius (note 96).

<sup>16</sup> 4.168. Cf. 14.46ff., 56ff., where a Plataean is represented as appealing to Athenian sympathy by stating that his fellow countrymen have become wanderers and beggars, not knowing where to turn, that their parents spend their old age in misery, that their children are enslaved, that families have been broken up, etc. In *Epist.* 9.8-10, he states that there is no pity for the terrible condition of Greece, in which some are killed, others are banished, property is looted, women and children are shamefully treated, etc.

<sup>17</sup> 9.6.

<sup>18</sup> 9.36.

<sup>19</sup> 9.70. Aristotle (*Poet.* 13.1453a25ff.) defends Euripides' use of the unhappy ending against unnamed critics. Is he thinking of Isocrates, who died shortly before the *Poetics* was written?

<sup>20</sup> 12.1.

of brothers, fathers, and guest friends, the pollution of mothers, incestuous marriages and their offspring, the eating of children, the drowning and blinding of parents, all so numerous that no tragedian ever lacked material for the annual stage performances.<sup>21</sup> He also recites stories taken from tragedies.<sup>22</sup>

When Isocrates states that the facts of history are the common property of all but are to be embellished by the intelligent he is thinking of oratory—that is, his kind of oratory (4.9). Yet we can understand that he would apply the same principle to historical writing. Aristotle, on the other hand, states that historical events belong to politics, not rhetoric (*Rhet.* 1.4.1360a35).

That Isocrates' speeches were thought of as historical works is shown in the letter of Speusippus to Philip of Macedon.<sup>23</sup> Isocrates had written a speech addressed to Philip in which he told of Philip's ancestry and his deeds. Speusippus writes to Philip to introduce the historian Antipater, who found errors of omission and commission in Isocrates' speech. Antipater's historical writing and Isocrates' speech are treated by Speusippus as quite parallel.

In his *Rhetoric* Aristotle places marvels (*θαυμαστά*) among the elements that attract the attention of the listeners in the introduction of a speech.<sup>24</sup> This view persisted in later treatises on rhetoric. So, for example, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who adds the element

<sup>21</sup> 9.121–122. In 15.46–47 he asserts that his political discourses are closer to poetry in style and thought than to forensic speeches and that they give the hearer just as much pleasure as poetry does.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* 168ff. I cannot agree with Paul Scheller, *De Hellenistica Historiae Conscribendae Arte* (Leipzig, 1911) 67, that Isocrates avoided stirring up passions and passed on that attitude to his pupils. He is supported only in part by Dionysius (*De Dem.* 18), who says that Isocrates was unable to stir the emotions of his listeners, and at times did not wish to, depending too much on flowery theatrical language. All that Dionysius has in mind is Isocrates' mildness as compared with the vigor of Demosthenes, whom he then proceeds to praise.

<sup>23</sup> Considered genuine by E. Bickermann, "Speusipps Brief an König Philipp," *Ber. Sächs. Akad. d. Wiss., Phil.-hist. Kl.*, 80 (1928) 3. Whether genuine or not is not of great importance for the point here made. The letter ends with the statement that papyrus was scarce because the king of Persia had seized Egypt. A later forger, especially during the Roman period in Egypt, would hardly think of this. Papyrus was expensive in Greece before Alexander's conquest of Egypt; after 322 the price dropped to about 4% of what it had been in 333 (G. Glotz, "Le prix du papyrus dans l'antiquité grecque," *Annales d'hist. écon. et soc.* 1 [1929] 3; J. A. O. Larsen in T. Frank, *Econ. Survey of Ancient Rome* [Baltimore, 1938] 4.396 f.). W. Schmid (*Gesch. d. griech. Lit.* [1934] 1.2.693, note 5) approves Bickermann's view and adds another argument.

<sup>24</sup> *Rhet.* 3.14.1415b2. A few lines later he indicates that such marvels hold the attention throughout.

of the incredible (*θαυμαστὰ καὶ παράδοξα*).<sup>25</sup> Such elements had been a feature of early history and its literary antecedents. The influence of Isocrates certainly tended to restore them to historical writing. As Schmid puts it, the rhetorical historians who followed Isocrates used "paradoxes" as stylistic seasoning.<sup>26</sup> Aristides could speak of the element of the incredible in historical works, at which the reader marvels (*καθάπερ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις παράδοξα οὕτως ἀκούομεν, θαυμάζοντες τὰ γιγνόμενα*).<sup>27</sup>

Not only did Isocrates write what is practically history in the tragic manner in some of his so-called speeches but he no doubt taught his pupils to write actual history in the same manner.<sup>28</sup> Among his pupils was the rhetorician and tragedian Theodectes, who wrote an encomiastic tragedy about Mausolus. Another was Asclepiades, who, significantly enough, wrote a work called *Τραγῶδούμενα*, a *historia fabulosa*, as Wilamowitz called it, a mythology based on tragedy rather than on epic or earlier mythological treatises.<sup>29</sup> Other pupils of Isocrates were the historians Ephorus and Theopompus.<sup>30</sup> Suidas reports a book of *Παράδοξα* by the former, perhaps consisting of extracts from his large history. It is generally accepted that Diodorus followed Ephorus closely in his earlier books and so presumably the remark in his Preface goes back to that source:

If the fictitious myths about Hades contribute to piety and justice in mankind, how much the more must we assume that history, the interpreter of truth and the source of all philosophy, can lead to perfection of character?<sup>31</sup>

Yet Ephorus himself criticized the writers who give details of cruel treatment because they know that the terrible and the marvelous

<sup>25</sup> *De Lysia* 24.

<sup>26</sup> W. von Christ, *Gesch. d. griech. Lit.* (1920) 2.237.

<sup>27</sup> *Or.* 38 (p. 724 Dind.).

<sup>28</sup> Cf. W. von Christ, *Gesch. d. griech. Lit.*,<sup>6</sup> 1.527. The importance of history in Isocrates' school is recognized by Gisela Schmitz-Kahlmann, "Das Beispiel der Geschichte im politischen Denken des Isokrates," *Ph Suppl.* 31.4 (1939) 119.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *RE* s.v., 1628, where he is compared with Ephorus.

<sup>30</sup> E. Schwartz's denial that Ephorus and Theopompus were actual students of Isocrates is not convincing (*RE* s.v. "Ephoros"); in any case he admits their stylistic dependence.

<sup>31</sup> 1.2. Attributed to Ephorus by G. L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge, 1935) 103. Laqueur, "Ephoros," *H* 46 (1911) 161 does not include Diodorus' first proemium among those derived from Ephorus but he does say that Ephorus wanted to prove thirty moral precepts and wrote thirty books for this purpose (344). For the influence of Isocrates cf. Barber, 75ff., Laqueur, 202, 342ff.

give a thrill (τὸ δεινὸν καὶ τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐκπληκτικὸν ὄν). He favors material that furnishes examples of morality and justice.<sup>32</sup> What Ephorus objected to in history was not the terrible and the marvelous as such but their use to give a mere thrill instead of developing character. In this he quite agrees with Aristotle on tragedy, but instead of differentiating history and tragedy he completely identifies them in method and purpose. Both of the passages are thoroughly Aristotelian—except for the really important point, the literary genre to which they are applied. The voice is Jacob's voice, but—. The myths about Hades are a reference to tragedy, for Aristotle discusses them in dealing with the visual, or spectacular, in tragedy, which he says produces mere sensationalism, not fear (which leads to catharsis), and sensationalism has nothing to do with tragedy.<sup>33</sup> Καλοκάγαθία (perfection of character) is an Aristotelian word<sup>34</sup> and may be considered the positive counterpart to the negative catharsis.<sup>35</sup> Perhaps, as Jacoby observes, Laqueur's statement is one-sided, that a book by Ephorus is a historical-epideictic excursus to Isocrates worked out in detail, but it is suggestive.<sup>36</sup>

Theopompus, who wrote speeches in the Isocratean manner as well as histories, appears to have favored the marvelous even more;

<sup>32</sup> Strabo 7.3.9. This last point is Isocratean; see Gisela Schmitz-Kahlmann, *op. cit.* (see note 28) 60.

<sup>33</sup> *Poet.* 18.1456a3 (the particular reading adopted here does not affect my point); 14.1453b7.

<sup>34</sup> See especially *Eth. Eud.* 8.3.1248b10, 1249a17, where it is called the combination of all the virtues and perfect virtue. Of course the word is not exclusively Aristotelian.

<sup>35</sup> A. H. R. Fairchild, "Aristotle's Doctrine of Katharsis and the Positive and Constructive Activity Involved," *CJ* 12 (1916) 44, points out that catharsis is purely negative, that there must be a positive side, which builds up, "on the basis of a character represented in the drama as failing, a corresponding ideal and successful character." The word καλοκάγαθία seems to represent that positive side and to be the word Fairchild was searching for. In the *Poetics* Aristotle says that tragedy represents people who are better than we are (15.1454b8) and quotes Sophocles, his favorite among the writers of tragedy, as saying that he represented people as they ought to be (25.1460b34). To be sure, the catharsis gives a sense of well-being—a pleasure Aristotle calls it (14.1453b11)—and this is positive, but he may have had in mind something higher than that. In *Pol.* 8.7.1341b38, in saying that music has more than one value, he adds that it may serve for paideia and catharsis. Here paideia seems to be the positive side of catharsis and not to be far removed from καλοκάγαθία, as readers of W. Jaeger's *Paideia* will realize; cf. especially 1.283 of the English translation: "Paideia . . . was used to denote the sum-total of all ideal perfections of mind and body—complete *kalokagathia*."

<sup>36</sup> Laqueur, *op. cit.* (see note 31) 345; F. Jacoby, *FGH* 2C.23. Good too is Laqueur's remark (346) that Ephorus' history was the logical consequence of Isocrates' speeches.

he was the source of the writers on "paradoxes."<sup>37</sup> Strabo says that historians as well as poets introduce myths for the sake of producing sensations and giving pleasure (*τερατείας καὶ τέρψεως χάριν*) and adds that Theopompus admitted that he would introduce myths.<sup>38</sup> Polybius criticized him for repeating impossible tales and prodigies (*τεραπευομένοις*),<sup>39</sup> and brackets both Ephorus and Theopompus with Timaeus in drawing on their imaginations to make up for lack of military knowledge.<sup>40</sup>

Timaeus was a student of a pupil of Isocrates and, traveling along the Isocratean way, reached a highly rhetorical style which approximated the grand style of tragedy. Bury remarks that this style reached its full development with Hegesias, and cites a passage comparing Athens and Thebes to the sun and moon. He aptly asks: "Is not this passage what one might look for in the chorus of a third-rate historical tragedy?"<sup>41</sup> The treatise *On the Sublime* (4) gives a number of examples of Timaeus' frigidity, caused by his failure to achieve the sublime. Polybius attacks Timaeus not only for his falsehoods but for his dreams, prodigies (*τεράτων*), and myths.<sup>42</sup> He is like a rhetorician in a school making a display of his ability.<sup>43</sup> In fact, his work is inferior even to school exercises.<sup>44</sup> He is exceeded in paradox by no schoolboy reading off his encomium of Thersites or his censure of Penelope.<sup>45</sup> He does, however, distinguish between history and declamation to the disadvantage of the latter: they differ as much as real buildings and furniture differ from stage scenery of them.<sup>46</sup> This is not unlike Aristotle's distinction between history and tragedy: the former recites real actions,

<sup>37</sup> Christ, *op. cit.* (see note 28) 1.533; Dion. Hal. *Ad Pomp.* 6 *θανυμαστόν ἢ παράδοξον*.

<sup>38</sup> 1.2.35.

<sup>39</sup> 16.12.7-9.

<sup>40</sup> 12.25f. In general, however, Polybius is less critical of Ephorus than of Theopompus. He praises Ephorus' distinction between history and oratory (12.28.11).

<sup>41</sup> *Op. cit.* (see note 11) 172. Horace makes fun of the Asiatic grand style by having a character address Brutus as the sun and his entourage as stars (*Serm.* 1.7.24). Clitarchus, the historian of Alexander, had similar tendencies. Cicero (*Br.* 43) classes him among those who elaborated in rhetorical and tragic fashion. "Longinus" (3.2) says that he is more bombastic than Callisthenes. Demetrius (304) calls him frigid. Jacoby, *RE* s.v. "Kleitarchos," 646, thinks that Diodorus 17 was based on Clitarchus and points out the frequency of the word *παράδοξος* in that book and its use with *μεταβολή* and *περιπέτεια*.

<sup>42</sup> 12.24.5.

<sup>43</sup> 12.25a5.

<sup>44</sup> 12.25k8; cf. 12.26.9.

<sup>45</sup> 12.26b5; for his excessive use of paradox cf. 12.26c.

<sup>46</sup> 12.28a1.



the latter is an imitation of them. Rhetorical declamation and tragedy, being alike dissimilar to history, must be similar to each other.

That Isocrates taught the writing of rhetorical history we can only infer from his work and from the fact that he was the teacher of the historians Ephorus and Theopompus. We have no definite knowledge that the writing of rhetorical history was a part of rhetorical training at such an early period. We can, however, be sure that it formed such a part as early as the second century B.C. We know that in the beginning of the first century B.C. this was true in Rome, for Cicero specifically states that there is a kind of *narratio* which has nothing to do with court cases but is spoken and written for pleasure and profitable training. One of the subdivisions of this *narratio* is historical, another is dramatic. One form of *narratio* emphasizes characters and their emotions.<sup>47</sup> We may even surmise that these were not always carefully differentiated. Later Greek treatises make observations similar to those of Cicero.<sup>48</sup>

It must be admitted that others hold that the Hellenistic type of history, with its leaning toward tragedy and its appeal to the emotions, was an invention of post-Aristotelian Peripatetics, partly in opposition to the Isocratean school. Eduard Schwartz expressed this view<sup>49</sup> and credited Theophrastus with the development of the theory. But there are two objections: first, that the theory is opposed to Aristotle's differentiation between history and poetry; second, that Isocrates, as we have seen, made use of tragic elements. It is, of course, not impossible that Theophrastus or some other follower of Aristotle should have deviated from the master's views. My only point is that the new theory stems more directly from Isocrates than from Aristotle.<sup>50</sup> This is implied by Polybius, who criticizes Zeno for being so interested in style that he does not

<sup>47</sup> Cic. *De inv.* 1.27; cf. *Ad Her.* 1.12-13. That Cicero illustrates history with a line from an epic poem is explained by Reitzenstein (see note 108) 93, note 1.

<sup>48</sup> G. Thiele, "Zum griechischen Roman," *Aus der Anomia . . . Carl Robert* (Berlin, 1890) 124; E. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman*<sup>3</sup> (Leipzig, 1914) 377 and W. Schmid, *ibid.* 603. The love romance is thought by Schmid to have originated in this rhetorical form.

<sup>49</sup> "Die Berichte über die catilinarische Verschwörung," *H* 32 (1897) 560 ff. Cf. *RE* s.v. "Duris," etc. So too Scheller, *op. cit.* (see note 22) 71, etc. One becomes weary of reading about "Peripatetic tragic history." One finds constant misinterpretation of Aristotle in the modern literature. He is supposed to have favored writing history after the fashion of tragedy; cf. e.g., C. Gramann (a pupil of Schwartz), *Quaestiones Diodoreae* (Goettingen, 1907) 22ff.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Christ-Schmid, *Gesch. d. griech. Lit.*<sup>6</sup> 1.1.204,237.

leave exaggerated sensationalism (*ὑπερβολὴν τερατείας*) to the producers of collections of declamatory works (*ἐπιδεικτικὰς συντάξεις*) written to give a thrill (*ἐκπληξιν*) to *hoi polloi*.<sup>51</sup> Sensationalism and thrills, here associated with rhetoric, are elsewhere attributed by Polybius to tragic history, as we shall see. Rhetorical (i.e., Isocratean) history is the same as tragic history in his eyes.

The Isocratean and Peripatetic schools of history no doubt mutually influenced each other, as Leo suggests,<sup>52</sup> though a tendency on the part of the Isocrateans to write treatises on first discoveries, as the Peripatetics did, or biographies that emphasized personal details is not much of a sign of real borrowing. Much more significant is the counter influence of Isocratean rhetoric on the Peripatetics.

Yet it is the common view that the Peripatetics were the originators of tragical history. This may be true but only in the accidental sense that its "inventor" may have been a student of Aristotle. From our survey of Aristotelian doctrine on history it is quite clear that any student of his who wrote tragical history was not a Peripatetic in that particular respect but a deserter to the camp of Isocrates.<sup>53</sup>

Callisthenes, a nephew of Aristotle, is sometimes regarded as the founder of tragical history. One fragment, at least, shows Aristotelian influence, though the full extent of it has not been noted, perhaps because the passage of Athenaeus (the writer on military machines), in which it occurs has sometimes been misunderstood.

Athenaeus begins his work with some observations on writing.<sup>54</sup> He does not intend to spend so much time in polishing up his work that it will lose its timeliness. He will not be as slow as Isocrates was when he gave advice to Philip: the war was over before Isocrates' advice was completed.<sup>55</sup> Rather he will follow those whose counsel is correct, as, for example, Callisthenes:

<sup>51</sup> 16.17.9-18.3.

<sup>52</sup> F. Leo, *Die griechisch-römische Biographie* (Leipzig, 1901) 110.

<sup>53</sup> I must therefore consider impossible the conclusion of Scheller, *op. cit.* (see note 22) 79, that the Isocratean historians avoided arousing the emotions and that the Peripatetics, in order to stir up emotion, drew on tragedy. See also W. Siegfried, *Studien zur geschichtlichen Anschauung des Polybios* (Leipzig, 1928).

<sup>54</sup> Rudolf Schneider, "Griechische Poliorketiker," *AGWG*, Phil.-Hist. Kl., N.F. 12 (1912), No. 5, 13. The Callisthenes quotation is also in *FGrH* 2B.654, 44; *Script. Rerum Alex. M.* 17, 19 (in Duebner's Arrian).

<sup>55</sup> This is based on a remark of Timaeus, as we know from "Longinus" 4.2.

‘Ο μὲν γὰρ ἱστοριογράφος Καλλισθένης φησί: “δεῖ τὸν γράφειν τι πειρώμενον μὴ ἀστοχεῖν τοῦ προσώπου ἀλλ’ οἰκείως αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τοὺς λόγους θείναι.” ‘Ο δὲ γε περὶ τοιαύτης τέχνης γινόμενος πᾶς λόγος συντομίας τε καὶ σαφηνείας ἐπιδείσθαι μοι δοκεῖ, τῶν δὲ ῥητορικῶν παραγγέλμάτων οὐκ οἰκείος εἶναι.

Mueller (who reads *δεῖν*) translates:

Callisthenes historicus dicit scribere aliquid tentantem debere non aberrare a persona sua, sed ratione quae conveniat ei rebusque gestis sermonem componere.

Similarly Schneider:

“Wer etwas schreiben wolle, dürfte die rechte Tonart nicht verfehlen, sondern müsse seine Worte so setzen, wie es seiner eigenen Persönlichkeit und seinem Gegenstande angemessen sei.” Sicherlich verlangt die Darstellung der Technik, so meine ich, Kürze und Klarheit, für die rhetorischen Vorschriften ist hier kein Platz.

These are impossible translations of the Greek. Clearly the *πρόσωπον* is not that of the historian but of the person about whom the history is written. This is shown too by Athenaeus’ application in the last sentence: his technical treatise (not of course he himself) requires brevity and clearness—just as Callisthenes’ subject required a treatment appropriate to the chief character and the facts. Jacoby sees this when he comments:<sup>56</sup>

Dass die eingelegten reden den tatsachen und dem charakter des redenden angepasst sein müssen, ist fortbildung der thukydideischen forderung . . . in richtung auf das stärkere hervortreten der persönlichheit in der geschichtsschreibung.

But whether this be an extension of Thucydides (1.22.1) or not, it is certainly an adaptation to history of Aristotle’s doctrine about tragedy:<sup>57</sup>

Περὶ δὲ τὰ ἥθη τέτταρά ἐστιν ὧν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι. . . . Δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἀρμόττον ἐστι. . . . Τρίτον δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον. . . . Ἔστιν δὲ παράδειγμα . . . τοῦ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ μὴ ἀρμόττοντος. . . . Χρὴ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἥθεσιν ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων συστάσει ἀεὶ ζητεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε τὸν τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός.

<sup>56</sup> *FGrH* 2D.431, 44; cf. *RE* s.v. “Kallisthenes,” 1691. Jacoby places the fragment among the “Fragmente unsicherer Stellung,” but, as we shall see, it can be definitely assigned to the book on Alexander.

<sup>57</sup> *Poet.* 15.1454a16–36.

In reference to the characters,<sup>58</sup> there are four things to aim at. . . . The second is appropriateness. . . . The third is harmony with the facts. . . . An example of inappropriate character. . . . One must always seek either the necessary or the probable in the characters just as in the incidents that make up the plot; so that a certain person will do or say certain things that are necessary or probable [in view of his character] and that one incident will happen after another in a way that is necessary or probable [he then goes into further details about the plot].

The similarity in language is striking enough: *μὴ ἀστοχεῖν* and *στοχάζεσθαι*; *προσώπων* and *ἥθη*; *ἀρμόττον* (*πρέπον*) and *οἰκείως*; <sup>59</sup> *πράγμασι* and *πραγμάτων*. More significant is the similarity in thought.<sup>60</sup>

Callisthenes told some marvelous tales, as that of the crows warning Alexander.<sup>61</sup> He asserted that in Pamphylia the sea rose (and retired) in honor of Alexander—a kind of proscynesis.<sup>62</sup> Plutarch, in obvious allusion to Callisthenes though he does not mention his name at this point, speaks of the historians who describe this miracle *πρὸς ἔκπληξιν καὶ ὄγκον*, for the sake of thrills and bombast (*Alex.* 17). He adds that Alexander himself mentioned no such miracle (*οὐδὲν τοιούτων τερατευσάμενος*). Strabo tells of the visit of Alexander to the oracle of Jupiter Ammon and the response he received that he was the son of Jupiter. But Callisthenes adds

<sup>58</sup> *ἥθος* means a character in a play in this chapter; cf. 1454a23 (and Bywater's note), and especially 24.1460a10: *εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ ἄλλο τι ἥθος*.

<sup>59</sup> Gudeman (on 15.1454a29) points out that in scholia Aristotle's *ἀρετοῦς καὶ μὴ ἀρμόττοντος* (*ἥθους*) is expressed by *παρὰ πρόσωπα*. Among his other examples are *Schol. Eurip. Med.* 922: *οὐ γὰρ οἰκείον τῷ προσώπῳ τούτῳ*; Theon, *Rhet. Graec.* 1.149 (2.60 Sp.): (*Ὁμηρος*) *οἰκείους λόγους περιτέθεικεν ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰσαγομένων προσώπων*.

<sup>60</sup> Pertinent too is Aristotle's remark in *Rhet.* 3.2.3.1404b16 that fine language should not be put in the mouth of a slave or a very young man. Schwartz (e.g., *RE* s.v. "Duris") recognizes the Aristotelian *πρέπον* in Callisthenes, but that does not go far enough.

<sup>61</sup> *Plut. Alex.* 27. Timaeus made fun of this (Polybius 12.12b).

<sup>62</sup> *FGH* 2B.650, 31; *Script. Rerum Alex.* M. 19, 25. There is an apparent inconsistency that many besides myself must have observed between Callisthenes' refusal to bow down to Alexander in the act of proscynesis and his acclamation of the same man as son of Zeus and his report about the proscynesis of the waters of the sea. It would not be worth mentioning this if it were not for an extraordinary interpretation put upon it by P. Corsen, "Das angebliche Werk des Olynthiers Kallisthenes über Alexander den Grossen," *Ph* 74 (1917) 1, who concludes from the inconsistency that the book on Alexander could not have been written by Callisthenes, in spite of the abundant ancient testimony. The simple explanation is, it seems to me, that it was quite in accordance with Greek notions to call a man the son of some god and that there was no objection to the waves and even Persians and other barbarians bowing down to Alexander, but to require this of a Greek was going just a little too far. There are many modern instances to show that what is sauce for the goose is not considered proper sauce for the gander.

some other miracles and prophecies in tragic fashion (προστραγωδεῖ τοῦτοις).<sup>63</sup>

In the treatise *On the Sublime* (3.1) the statement is made that since even in tragedy, which is dignified and permits bombast, too much turgidity is unpardonable, a turgid style would scarcely be suited to the presentation of real facts. For this reason, the writer continues, Gorgias is ridiculed for such expressions as "Xerxes, the Zeus of the Persians"; likewise Callisthenes, some of whose phrases are not sublime but high-flown. Here Callisthenes is bracketed with tragedy and with the supreme rhetorician Gorgias—an enlightening grouping which suggests the origin of tragical history in rhetoric under the influence of tragedy.

What work of Callisthenes did the critic of style have in mind? Obviously the book on Alexander, in which he tells about the crows and the recognition of Alexander as son of Zeus. It may be just a coincidence that "Longinus" quotes Gorgias' "Xerxes, the Zeus of the Persians" just before mentioning Callisthenes, but it is not at all impossible that the Gorgian phrase made him think of the famous story of Jupiter Ammon, according to which Alexander was the son of Zeus and which Callisthenes played up so much. Furthermore, it is all but certain that Callisthenes' observation about suiting the word to the character and the action comes from the preface of the same book on Alexander: probably Callisthenes explains that a man of such lofty attainments as Alexander deserves a lofty style, that, shall we say, he is a hero of quite the same stature as Heracles or any of the other heroes of Greek tragedy.

Although Callisthenes was the nephew and pupil of Aristotle and followed him to some extent, his views on tragical history seem to be of Isocratean origin.<sup>64</sup> It was a betrayal of Aristotle's creed to apply his pronouncements about tragedy to history.

<sup>63</sup> 17.1.43 (FGrH 2B.645, 14; *Script. Rerum Alex. M.* 27, 36). For a discussion of this passage see Larsen in *CPh* 27 (1932) 70.

<sup>64</sup> Even Schwartz, who attributes the invention of tragical history to the Peripatetics, particularly Callisthenes, agrees that Callisthenes was greatly influenced by Isocrates in style, and this admission is a considerable weakening of his position (*H* 44 [1909] 492, 495). When he says (491) that, thanks to the teaching of his uncle, Callisthenes introduced a new artistic principle, by making history the younger sister of tragedy, he is right about the last part but uses "thanks to" in a curious fashion. Evidently Cicero is right (*De or.* 2.58) in saying that Callisthenes, although he started out as a philosopher and student of Aristotle, wrote history *rhetorico paene more*, like Ephorus and Theopompus, who came by their rhetoric naturally as students of Isocrates. This is a clear recognition that Callisthenes abandoned Aristotle in favor of Isocrates.

The case for a Peripatetic origin of Hellenistic tragic history perhaps rests on Duris, a historian who is said to have been a pupil of Theophrastus.<sup>65</sup> Still it is admitted that his views did not derive from Peripatetic doctrine, though he was influenced by it.<sup>66</sup> He wrote a treatise on tragedy and one on Euripides and Sophocles besides several histories. Duris criticized Ephorus and Theopompus as being inferior to the events they narrate. They lack imitation (*μίμησις*) and charm of expression, for they are concerned only with the writing out of the facts (*τοῦ γράφειν*).<sup>67</sup> As Scheller notes,<sup>68</sup> the sentence is explained by one in Diodorus which must go back to Duris,<sup>69</sup> but Scheller does not see all the implications of the parallel. Diodorus says that in real life many things happen at the same time, but the historian must describe them one at a time in an unnatural fashion; hence it is that the real facts of history involve emotion (*πάθος*) but the writing of history, deprived of this possibility, though imitating the facts, is inferior to them. What Duris in the former passage means by his Aristotelian language but non-Aristotelian thought is that there is not enough tragedy in the histories of Ephorus and Theopompus. He himself put more tragedy into his own books. Plutarch says that Duris exaggerates in tragic fashion (*ἐπιτραγωδεῖ*) in accusing Pericles of cruelty, and gives an example.<sup>70</sup> Diodorus, in a passage probably

<sup>65</sup> The correctness of this statement might be questioned. Athenaeus (8.18.377d) speaks of "Lynceus, the Samian, pupil of Theophrastus, brother of Duris, the historian." If we had only this statement (which Suidas in effect repeats), we should infer that Duris was *not* the pupil of Theophrastus. But elsewhere (4.1.128a) Athenaeus says that "Hippolochus was born in the time of Lynceus and Duris, the Samians, pupils of Theophrastus." If the first quotation is correct, the second might be interpreted as a carelessly abbreviated form of expression.

<sup>66</sup> E. Schwartz in *RE* s.v. "Duris."

<sup>67</sup> *FHG* 2.469, 1 *FGH* 2A.138, 1. E. Schwartz, "Die Zeit des Ephoros," *H* 44 (1909) 492, note 1, interprets *γράφειν* as the epideictic Isocratean style, which, to my mind, does not contrast properly with "charm of expression" (*ῥηδονῆς ἐν τῷ φράσαι*). Schwartz correctly notes that the *μίμησις* is that of Aristotle's *Poetics*. But Aristotle reserves it for poetry and music. Poor Aristotle! To have even his sacred *μίμησις* applied to history! Plutarch too applies it to history (*De gloria Ath.* 3). Schwartz is again wrong in comparing Duris' criticism with that of Callisthenes (see page 35). Nor do I agree with Scheller, *op. cit.* (see note 22) 68f.

<sup>68</sup> *Op. cit.* 69.

<sup>69</sup> 20.43.7. Surely Laqueur, *RE* s.v. "Timaioi," 1199, is wrong in attributing it to Timaeus, since it fits in so well with Duris' criticism of Ephorus and Theopompus. For the Aristotelian language see note 7.

<sup>70</sup> *Per.* 28.2. But this must not be considered too significant, as Dionysius uses the same word of Thucydides (*De Thuc.* 28).

based on Duris,<sup>71</sup> notes the unexpected outcome (*παράδοξον*) of Agathocles' expedition to Africa and the punishment of his children by divine providence. He lost a large army in Sicily but with a small army was victorious in Africa, just as if Fortune purposely were showing her power. After his success, he killed his friend Ophellas. Then providence intervened. On the anniversary of Ophellas' death, Agathocles lost his sons and his troops. God exacted a double penalty: two sons for one friend. This is clearly a tragic plot.<sup>72</sup> Didymus, reporting a story from Duris about Philip, says that here too Duris is given to sensationalism (*τετρα-τεύσεσθαι*).<sup>73</sup>

Duris was so influenced by tragedy that he constantly mentions the various costumes in which his characters strut across the stage in appropriate stage setting. He was more than usually fond of quoting lines from tragedy. He brought actors into his historical writing and made use of comparisons taken from the theater. He tried to stir the emotions of his readers.<sup>74</sup>

Phylarchus was another notable example of a tragical historian. Polybius' detailed criticism on this score will be discussed when we come to that author. Phylarchus tells the story of the courtesan Danaë, who saved her lover Sophron from Laodice, who had previously poisoned her husband Antiochus II. For her action Danaë was condemned to death by Laodice. Danaë's last words, according to Phylarchus, were: "The majority of men despise divine providence and rightly so; for this is the reward I receive for saving a man, while Laodice, who killed her own husband, is highly honored."<sup>75</sup> This story, calculated to arouse pity, while not exactly a peripety, recalls Aristotle's illustration of one: Lynceus is led off for execution by Danaus, but actually it is Danaus who is put to death.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>71</sup> So Schwartz, *RE* s.v. "Duris"; Diod. 20.70. Rudolf Schubert, *Geschichte des Agathokles* (Breslau, 1887), 181, credits it to Timaeus. So does Laqueur, *RE* s.v. "Timaios," 1174. Favoring this view, though Laqueur does not mention it, is the fact that Timaeus seems unusually fond of chronological coincidences (Laqueur, 1199 and Cic. *Nat.* 2.69, attributed to Timaeus). For the present purpose it is immaterial which of these tragic historians was Diodorus' source. But see note 69.

<sup>72</sup> Other tragic situations which may go back to Duris are to be found in Diodorus.

<sup>73</sup> *FGrH* 2A.148, 36.

<sup>74</sup> Rudolf Schubert, *Geschichte des Pyrrhus* (Königsberg, 1894) 15ff.; Bury, *op. cit.* (see note 11) 172-173.

<sup>75</sup> *FGrH* 2A.167, 24; *FHG* 1.339, 23.

<sup>76</sup> *Poet.* 9.1452a27.

Phylarchus also tells the story of Phayllus, who was in love with the wife of Ariston and promised her anything she craved. When she asked for Eriphyle's necklace, which was in the temple of Athena at Delphi, he sacked the holy place and presented her with the necklace. Then, as Phylarchus remarks, a fate similar to that of Eriphyle overtook her: the younger of her two sons went mad and set fire to the house. The mother perished in the conflagration.<sup>77</sup>

From all this it is clear that many, perhaps most, historians were disregarding Aristotle's advice to make a rigorous differentiation between history and tragedy, were seeking out stories similar to those favored by the classic tragedians, and were trying to stir up the same emotions of pity and fear that, according to Aristotle, belong to the particular sphere of the tragedians. We have noted no real protests against this practice. The first criticism of this pervading view comes from Polybius, though even he likes at least to compare history with tragedy. Thus in the introductory words of his history, he states that everyone is positive that the only way to learn how to endure the vicissitudes of fortune (*τύχης μεταβολάς*)<sup>78</sup> is the recollection of the reversals of fortune (*περιπετειῶν*) of others. The incredible (*παράδοξον*) nature of the events which he is going to describe will challenge the attention of the reader.<sup>79</sup> Then he speaks of the incredible (*παράδοξον*) character of the spectacle (*θεῶρημα*) presented by his story (*ὑπόθεσιν*). A little later Polybius explains why he gives a summary of the First Punic War before beginning his history proper: because it is not easy to find a war that lasted longer, or greater preparations, or more continuous activity, or more battles, or greater reversals of fortune (*περιπετείας*).<sup>80</sup> Again he observes that the story of Regulus shows clearly that we must not put our faith in Fortune, especially in prosperous times. For Regulus, who shortly before had refused pity and pardon to others, was now led away a prisoner to plead for

<sup>77</sup> *FGrH* 2A.186, 70; *FHG* 1.353, 60. For this story cf. also below, p. 49.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Arist. *Poet.* 7.1451a14 *ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν*, of the tragic hero. Polybius certainly was acquainted with and approved of Aristotle's distinction between history and tragedy. I do not agree with Rudolf von Scala, *Die Studien des Polybios* (Stuttgart, 1890) 1.77ff., 126ff., that there is much difference between the two, though I grant that Polybius may have attached greater importance to history than Aristotle did. Polybius, in definitely returning to the Aristotelian distinction, is in opposition to most of his predecessors.

<sup>79</sup> 1.1.2-2.1. For *παράδοξον* cf. also 3.4.13.

<sup>80</sup> 1.13.11.



his life. There follows a quotation from Euripides, with the comment that one learns more painlessly through the misfortunes of others but more effectively through one's own reversals of fortune (περιπετειῶν).<sup>81</sup>

Polybius is, however, of greatest interest to us when he criticizes those who write tragical history. An example is the passage in which he explains why he followed Aratus rather than Phylarchus in describing the Cleomenic War.<sup>82</sup> Phylarchus is not only haphazard in his statements but tries to stir up pity in his readers by bringing on (εἰσάγει, sometimes used of the stage) crowds of women with disheveled hair and bared breasts or again men and women weeping and wailing in the midst of their children and aged parents, as they are carried off into slavery. Throughout he tries to place terrible things (δεινά) before our eyes. Polybius adds that the historian should not thrill (ἐκπλήττειν, as below) his readers by telling sensational stories (τερατευόμενον) or inventing the speeches his characters might have made or counting up the consequences of his story, as the tragic poets do. The aim of history and tragedy is not the same—quite the contrary. The tragic poet should thrill (ἐκπλήξει) <sup>83</sup> and attract (ψυχαγωγῆσαι) <sup>84</sup> his audience by plausible statements, the historian should instruct the learner by true facts and statements.<sup>85</sup> Besides, Phylarchus relates the reversals of fortune without giving the causes and turns of events (περιπετειῶν, οὐχ ὑποτιθεῖς αἰτίαν καὶ τρόπον τοῖς γινόμενοις, *causas et modos ludumque Fortunae*, as in Horace below), without which one cannot arouse pity and anger in a reasonable way. He told falsehoods for the sake of sensationalism (τερατείας).<sup>86</sup> It is the tragic writers who tell sensational tales (τερατεῖαν).<sup>87</sup> Plutarch too speaks about Phy-

<sup>81</sup> 1.35.1-7; cf. 1.87.1; 2.35.8.

<sup>82</sup> 2.56.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Arist. *Poet.* 14.1454a4 ἐκπληκτικόν (Bywater and Gudeman *ad loc.*) and 16.1455a17, of the ἀναγνώρισις of tragedy. See also above p. 34. Cf. too *Vita Aesch.* πρὸς ἐκπληξιν τερατώδη and ἐκπλήξει τὸν δῆμον; "Longinus" 1.4 σὺν ἐκπλήξει τοῦ πιθανοῦ . . . κρατεῖ τὸ θανάσιον.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Arist. *Poet.* 6.1450a33 ψυχαγωγεῖ, of the reversals of fortune in tragedy, and 6.1450b17 ψυχαγωγικόν, of the actual presentation (δψις) of a tragedy. Cf. Bywater and especially Gudeman *ad loc.*; cf. Polyb. 12.25b2.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Arist. *Poet.* 9.1451a36 sqq., partly paraphrased above. Polybius uses *πιθανωτάτων* (2.56.11; cf. 3.48.9, etc.), Aristotle τὰ δυνάτὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκός. Gudeman on 1451b16 shows that εἰκός is equivalent to πιθανόν. Polybius constantly emphasizes the need for truthfulness in history (1.14.6, etc.).

<sup>86</sup> 2.58.12; cf. 2.59.3.

<sup>87</sup> 2.17.6.

larchus in much the same way.<sup>88</sup> He charges that Phylarchus all but brings in a stage machine as in a tragedy by dragging in the sons of Themistocles to stir up strife and emotion. The fragments of Phylarchus confirm these criticisms, as we have seen.

To return to Polybius, we find him charging that some writers represent (παρεισάγουσι) Scipio as succeeding in unexpected ways (παράλογως) and through chance, for they consider such men more divine and more marvelous (θαυμαστοτέρους).<sup>89</sup> Again, we are told about the historians who in their ignorance introduce heroes to show Hannibal the way through the Alps. They fall into situations similar to those of the writers of tragedies who have to resort to a *deus ex machina*.<sup>90</sup> Other historians are addicted to the incredible and sensational (παράδοξολογίας καὶ τερατείας).<sup>91</sup>

Of special significance in view of Polybius' own practice and of later developments are his remarks about the writers of particular histories.<sup>92</sup> These writers, dealing as they do with plots (ὑποθέσεις) that are narrow, and being hard up for facts, must make small things great. They introduce the sensational (τερατεία) and describe in tragic fashion (τραγωδοῦντες) the cruelty and impiety of Hieronymus and his unexpected and terrible death (τὸ παράλογον καὶ τὸ δεινόν).<sup>93</sup> Timaeus, who wrote a particular history, is criticized for his sensationalism (τεράτων) and for trying to make Sicily appear greater than all the rest of Greece, its history more illustrious and noble than that of other regions, its philosophers wiser, its statesmen more divine, with the result that not even the schoolboys can outdo him in paradoxes when they eulogize or criticize.<sup>94</sup> The writers of particular histories (τῶν τὰς κατὰ μέρος γραφόντων πράξεις) are criticized again for various faults, such as not being concerned about the real facts and the handling of the story but about the elaboration of the style. This care for style leads to

<sup>88</sup> *Them.* 32.

<sup>89</sup> 10.2.5-6.

<sup>90</sup> 3.48.8.

<sup>91</sup> 3.58.9. His criticism of Theopompus' sensationalism has already been mentioned. Cf. too 3.47.6 ἐκπλήττειν τῇ παραδοξολογίᾳ.

<sup>92</sup> 7.7.6, ἐπὶ μέρος, as contrasted with the general history, τὸ καθόλου, which Polybius writes. Elsewhere too he points out the superiority of the universal historian (3.32; 12.23.7). This distinction is not the same as Aristotle's τὰ καθόλου applied to poetry, and τὰ καθ' ἑκάστων, applied to history (*Poet.* 9.1451b7).

<sup>93</sup> 7.7.1-2, 6.

<sup>94</sup> 12.24.5; 26b.4ff. My statement that Timaeus wrote particular history is based on 12.23.7, where he is contrasted with writers of general history.

sensationalism (τερατείας) for the sake of producing thrills (ἐκπληξιν).<sup>95</sup> The same class of writers is criticized again for making small things great because of their simple plots, for elaborating, and for making up untrue stories.<sup>96</sup> Again Polybius refers to the historians who make use of sensationalism (τερατείας) for the sake of thrills (ἐκπληξιν) and who introduce the incredible (παράδοξον).<sup>97</sup> He thinks that thrilling reversals of fortune (ἐκπληκτικὰς περιπετείας) deserve notice only once and serve no useful purpose thereafter.<sup>98</sup> The detailed presentation of events that do not produce either admiration or pleasure is more appropriate to tragedy than to history.<sup>99</sup>

These summaries make abundantly clear through the thoughts expressed and the Greek words which I have quoted that Polybius bears a close relation to Aristotle<sup>100</sup> and that there were historians who wrote history in the tragic manner, with less emphasis on truth and more on the sensationalisms and horrors of tragedy. The contrast between the two types is of course one familiar in the field of style: the plain style aims to instruct by presenting facts, the grand style to give pleasure.<sup>101</sup>

Not only does Polybius link history and tragedy in his condemnation of Phylarchus but, as has recently been shown, he himself was guilty of writing tragic history in one episode, the story of Philip V of Macedon.<sup>102</sup> Starting with the observation of Benecke<sup>103</sup> that the origin of the story seems to be in tragedies or

<sup>95</sup> 16.14.1; 17.9; 18.2.

<sup>96</sup> 29.12.1-3, 8. Polybius' τὰ μὲν μικρὰ μεγάλα ποιεῖν sounds like a censure of Isocrates' statement that rhetoric (λόγοι) can τοῖς μικροῖς μέγεθος περιθεῖναι (4.8).

<sup>97</sup> 15.34.1-2.

<sup>98</sup> 15.36.2; also ἐκπληκτικῶν συμπτωμάτων and παραλόγους περιπετείας (4); cf. ἐκπληκτικωτάτας περιπετείας in 3.4.5.

<sup>99</sup> 15.36.7. Polybius does not specifically mention writers of particular histories in this passage but he clearly has them in mind; cf. his characterization of writers who think that the events in which they have taken part are the greatest and most marvelous that ever happened (15.36.9) with his remarks about making small things great (7.7.6; 29.12.2). He has Timaeus in mind here.

<sup>100</sup> Polybius' ideas of unity are perhaps derived from Aristotle's *Poetics* 23.1459a17ff.; cf. P. Scheller, *op. cit.* (see note 22) 42. Of course, not every occurrence of περιπέτεια in Polybius is necessarily to be explained in the technical Aristotelian sense, nor are the other words quoted always Aristotelian reminiscences, but the general relation is clear and certain.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Horace *A.P.* 333. Polybius himself says (9.2.6) that he aims not at pleasure (τέρψεως) but usefulness (ὠφελείας); cf. 15.36.3, 10. Similarly Dion. Hal. *Ad Pomp.* 6 about Theopompus, etc.

<sup>102</sup> F. W. Walbank, *JHS* 58 (1938) 55. He does not bring the Aristotelian distinction between history and tragedy into his discussion.

<sup>103</sup> *CAH* 8.254.

historical novels, Walbank shows convincingly that Polybius, the source of Livy, made out of the Philip story an Aristotelian tragedy. He did not use a tragedy or novel as a source, but his love for driving home a moral led him to give a tragic mold, with the trimmings of furies and curses, to what he thought were the facts of Philip's life and policy.<sup>104</sup> Polybius was not above writing tragic history if he felt that the facts warranted it.<sup>105</sup> He saw no objection to *θαυμαστὰ καὶ παράδοξα* as such.

Polybius may also have written tragic history on another occasion. We have seen him frequently criticizing the writers of particular histories for writing in tragic fashion. He states that this fault is almost inevitable in that kind of history. Yet we know that he himself wrote a particular history, that of the Numantine War.<sup>106</sup>

We come now to the document which started me on this quest, the well-known letter (*Fam.* 5.12) in which Cicero urges Lucceius to write a separate history of his (Cicero's) consulship before reaching that point in the general history of the Civil Wars on which Lucceius is engaged, and to neglect the laws of history to the extent of glorifying Cicero a bit more than a strict regard for the truth might warrant. The casual reader merely raises his eyebrows and smiles cynically when he reads this; to him the remark fits in with other characteristics of Cicero that have been prominently (too prominently, I think) before our eyes since the days of Mommsen. But to the serious reader the letter has given much trouble.

Mlle. Guillemin has recently discussed the letter once more.<sup>107</sup> The chief point in her paper is to call attention to Reitzenstein's more or less forgotten discussion.<sup>108</sup> That this letter is the only

<sup>104</sup> The treatise *On the Sublime* (15.8) criticizes the orators who, *like the tragedians*, see furies, for in oratory actuality and truth are best. The same could be said about history; in fact Polybius does say so elsewhere.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. Scheller, *op. cit.* (see note 22) 60-61.

<sup>106</sup> Cic. *Fam.* 5.12, discussed below. That he could depart from sober truth if the occasion demanded is indicated by Polybius himself. He tells us that he wrote a biography of Philopoemen in which, in accordance with the traditional form of the encomium, he amplified the facts (rhetorically), a procedure not appropriate to his history, which demands exact truth (10.21.6-8).

<sup>107</sup> "La lettre de Ciceron à Luccéius," *REL* 16 (1938) 96.

<sup>108</sup> R. Reitzenstein, *Hellenistische Wundererzählungen* (Leipzig, 1906) 84ff. C. Lauckner, *Die künstlerischen und politischen Ziele der Monographie Sallusts über den Jugurthinischen Krieg* (Borna-Leipzig, 1911) 59-60, is quite unconvincing in his rejection of Reitzenstein's interpretation of Cicero's letter and shows that he missed the point completely.

Hellenistic theory of the writing of history, as Reitzenstein asserts, is, in view of the preceding discussion, scarcely true. But he makes an excellent point, confirmed by what has already been said, that Cicero distinguished between a continuous or general history and a monograph or particular history. The former follows the chronological order and serves *veritas* and *utilitas*; the latter is more artistic, more akin to poetry, and aims at *delectatio*. Reitzenstein points to Cicero's own comparison of this kind of monograph to a play in such expressions as "argumento . . . persona . . . hanc quasi fabulam rerum eventorumque nostrorum—habet enim varios actus, multas actiones." He goes on to analyze briefly Sallust's monographs on Jugurtha and Catiline as plays.<sup>109</sup> He alludes to the influence of the dramatic monograph on Tacitus' continuous histories. Later Mendell approached the subject of Tacitus' dramatic form independently and from a somewhat different point of view.<sup>110</sup> Laqueur's acute comment on Reitzenstein's explanation is this: the logical conclusion of Duris' dictum that the multiplicity of facts prevents the historian from arousing emotion (see above p. 38) is that to arouse emotion we must concentrate on a single event, i.e., write a monograph.<sup>111</sup> To put it another way, a monograph achieves unity and eliminates one of the main differences between history and tragedy as set forth by Aristotle.<sup>112</sup>

But to return to Cicero's letter. Reitzenstein merely alludes to Aristotle's remarks on tragedy; Mlle. Guillemin expands somewhat but does not present all the pertinent data. Neither has examined the tantalizingly brief but significant remarks of Hellenistic historians and critics. Neither refers to the important pro-

<sup>109</sup> But cf. K. Latte, *Sallust* (Leipzig, 1935) 29f.

<sup>110</sup> C. W. Mendell, "Dramatic Construction of Tacitus' Annals," *YClS* 5 (1935). Cf. Norden in A. Gercke and E. Norden, *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft*<sup>3</sup> (Leipzig, 1927) 1.4.79. It is not my intention to carry this survey beyond Cicero. Tragical history became so familiar that Dionysius of Halicarnassus even speaks of the *θεατρικὰς τῶνς περιπέτειαις* of the earliest Greek historians (*De Thuc.* 5; cf. 7). The same phrase is applied by way of comparison to the story of the Horatii and Curiatii (*Ant.* 3.18). Even Thucydides is said to describe terrible and pitiful sufferings in such a way that he left future historians and poets no chance for further exaggeration (*De Thuc.* 15). Nicholas of Damascus might also be mentioned and Lucian (*De consc. hist.* 8, 26). For Justinus see Laqueur in *BPhW* 28 (1908) 961. See also W. Kroll, *Studien zum Verständnis der römischen Literatur* (Stuttgart, 1924) 331ff.

<sup>111</sup> *BPhW* 28 (1908) 962.

<sup>112</sup> See note 7. Of course the line between universal history and monograph is not sharp; in Polybius' eyes Luceius' history of the Civil War would have been a monograph.

nouncements on general and particular histories that Polybius utters, though Reitzenstein quotes his remark about the biography of Philopoemen (see note 106). Polybius' remarks on particular histories, unknown to Reitzenstein, are a guarantee of the correctness of the latter's interpretation of Cicero's letter. "Particular history" as used by Polybius is of course identical with the monograph that Cicero had in mind. As a matter of fact, Cicero makes a very interesting remark that is of great importance. He asks Luceius to consider whether instead of writing up the Catiline conspiracy along with foreign wars in his general history, he would not prefer to write it up separately, as many Greeks did, Callisthenes in the case of the Phocian War, Timaeus in that of the war with Pyrrhus, Polybius in that of the Numantine War.

Let us look into these works. Unfortunately we know nothing directly about the book on the Numantine War,<sup>113</sup> but we noted that Polybius says that it is almost impossible to write particular histories without resorting to the devices of tragedy and that he deviated from strict truth in an encomiastic biography of Philopoemen. Furthermore, we can arrive at some probable conclusions about the monograph on the Numantine War. This war gave Polybius suitable material for embellishment in a particular history. The chief point of interest is that the hero of the war, the man who brought it to its conclusion, a conclusion so tragic for the people of Numantia, was the younger Scipio—the very same man who was Polybius' best friend. We may surmise that Cicero wanted Luceius to play Polybius to Cicero's Scipio.

The Numantine War lasted from 143–133, but there are reasons for believing that Polybius started with the Celtiberian War of 153 and thus overlapped his universal history, which ended about 146. One reason is that, since Scipio must have been the main figure in Polybius' monograph, the latter surely would have begun early

<sup>113</sup> The only direct mention of it is in Cicero's letter but it certainly was used by other writers. A. Schulten, "Polybius und Posidonius über Iberien und die iberischen Kriege," *H* 46 (1911) 568 (and in other writings), has made it plausible that Appian used Posidonius and that the latter, in continuing Polybius' universal history, employed both that work and the Numantine monograph. Diodorus, he thinks, used Polybius' large work for the earlier period but Posidonius after that. He does not draw the significant conclusion (which in turn perhaps bolsters his argument) that the scarce Numantine monograph was not available to Diodorus. That Posidonius used and Cicero mentioned this monograph may not be mere chance: Cicero was the pupil and friend of Posidonius and may have known of the book from him. In fact, four years before appealing to Luceius Cicero had asked Posidonius to write a monograph on the same subject but was refused (*Att.* 2.1.2).

enough to mention Scipio's first appearance in Spain in 151. Furthermore, in 143 the colorful Viriathus was in full career and Polybius would have wanted to go back to 147, when Viriathus first takes the spotlight.<sup>114</sup>

The twenty-year war gave excellent opportunity for monographic development, that is for tragic treatment and embellishment. In his continuous history Polybius describes the first part of the war as being like fire, if any war can so be called, in that it was not decided like most wars by one or two short battles but was a continuous, exhausting performance.<sup>115</sup> It was, in the much abused language of today, an "epic" struggle. Its remarkable uniqueness (*θαυμαστήν ιδιότητα*, in Polybius' words) makes it fine material for a particular history. Among the events of the war that lent themselves to tragic elaboration were Nobilior's losses and sufferings, Lucullus' treachery and cruelty, Pompeius' attempt to change the course of a river. The story of Viriathus ("ex pastore venator, ex venatore latro, mox iusti quoque exercitus dux"; Livy *Per.* 52) and his death had its possibilities. Not that Polybius necessarily played up all or any of these episodes. Even in Appian's condensed version of Polybius' monograph we can get an occasional glimpse of Polybius himself. When the Numantine leader pleaded with Scipio he used a Polybian (and Aristotelian) word, *μεταβολή*, "change of fortune."<sup>116</sup> When the Numantines finally surrendered, after resorting to cannibalism, they were like wild beasts, pitiful (*ἐλεεινοί*), yet fearful (*φοβεροί*).<sup>117</sup> This Aristotelian language of tragedy probably stems from Polybius.

Of Timaeus' history of the war with Pyrrhus we know little that bears on our problem but we have already noted the criticism of even his general history as highly rhetorical.<sup>118</sup> Cicero himself

<sup>114</sup> That Polybius himself called the Numantine War a twenty-year war is the mistaken assertion of A. Schulten in his more recent discussions (*Geschichte von Numantia* [Munich, 1933] 34; *RE* s.v. "Numantia," 1258). Even worse is his coupling of this statement with Polybius' description of the Celtiberian War, which began in 153, as a fiery war. The latter statement occurs in 35.1, which was written long before Polybius knew how long the war would last!

<sup>115</sup> Schulten's interpretation of *πύρινος* as like a forest fire does not square with Polybius' explanation, which seems to indicate that the fighting was "hot."

<sup>116</sup> *Iber.* 95. See notes 9 and 78.

<sup>117</sup> *Iber.* 97.

<sup>118</sup> From Cicero's remarks one might gather that Timaeus eulogized Pyrrhus, but that may not have been the case. According to Schubert, *op. cit.* (see note 74) 48, Timaeus must have been hostile to Pyrrhus, because the latter so often followed in the political footsteps of Agathocles, whom Timaeus violently opposed. This is not very

says that Timaeus used the grand Asiatic style (*Br.* 325). The theme of the Pyrrhic War lent itself to embellishment: the character of Pyrrhus, his restless yearning for new worlds to conquer contrasted with Cineas' advice to settle down, his "Pyrrhic" victory, his elephants, the stories of Fabricius and of Pyrrhus' would-be poisoner, and above all the manner of his death, more tragic, in the Greek sense, than the invention of any tragedian. Pyrrhus fits Aristotle's definition of the tragic hero (*Poet.* 13.1453a10): he is neither a paragon of virtue nor a complete villain, but he has a flaw of character that leads to his downfall.

That brings us to Callisthenes and the Phocian (or Sacred) War. We have seen that Callisthenes was so notorious as a tragical historian that some have called him the founder of tragical history. But in some ways the subject of his monograph is even more interesting than the historian: It was eagerly seized upon not only by Callisthenes but by other tragical historians and elaborated in separate monographs: Demophilus, son of Ephorus, who added it as the thirtieth book to his father's history; Leo of Byzantium, a pupil of Plato or Aristotle but otherwise unknown; Cephisodorus, generally identified as a pupil of Isocrates. Writers such as Duris and Phylarchus dealt with it in their longer works. Schwartz is wrong in saying that Isocrateans and Aristotelians vied with one another in writing up the Sacred War <sup>119</sup> but he is right in the facts behind his statement, that many wrote on this theme. In my view, most, if not all, wrote under the influence of Isocrates, as we should expect from our earlier discussion.

substantial evidence, but if it is accepted, it is of importance for Cicero's attitude. B. Niese, "Zur Geschichte des Pyrrhischen Krieges," *H* 31 (1896) 482, does not believe that Plutarch in his *Pyrrhus* drew heavily on Timaeus, but W. Hoffmann, "Der Kampf zwischen Rom und Tarent im Urteil der antiken Ueberlieferung," *H* 71 (1936) 22, approves Schubert's view that Plutarch followed an aristocratic Tarentine source, apparently accepting, though he does not mention, Schubert's argument that Timaeus was the intermediary between the two. In general, the silence about Timaeus' monograph on the Pyrrhic War is profound. J. Beloch does not mention it in discussing sources in his *Griechische Geschichte*. E. Schwartz, *RE* s.v. "Diodoros," 688, after a long discussion of Diodorus' sources, says nothing about Book 22, which deals with Pyrrhus, nor does he mention G. Collmann, *De Diodori Siculi Fontibus* (Leipzig, 1869) 63-64, who believes (on very slight evidence, to be sure) that Diodorus' source in this book was Timaeus' monograph. R. Laqueur, *RE* s.v. "Timaios," devotes 127 columns to that author but barely mentions the monograph on Pyrrhus. Since Dionysius of Halicarnassus alludes to the work (*Ant.* 1.6) there are probably borrowings from it in his history. The *RE* discussion of Pyrrhus is not available to me.

<sup>119</sup> *H* 44 (1909) 483.



The fact is that the Phocian War was a gold mine for tragical historians. Athenaeus quotes from the thirtieth book of Ephorus.<sup>120</sup> Even the Phocian women, he says, helped plunder Delphi. One obtained the necklace of Eriphyle and plotted her husband's death, just as Eriphyle was responsible for the death of her husband Amphiaraus. We may note that through Amphiaraus and her son Alcmaeon, Eriphyle played a prominent part in Greek tragedy. Aristotle mentions her murder by Alcmaeon among the traditional stories of tragedy along with that of Clytaemnestra by Orestes (*Poet.* 14.1453b24). Demophilus goes on to say that another woman got hold of Helen's necklace and promptly imitated its former owner by running off with a young man from Epirus. Diodorus tells a similar tale.<sup>121</sup> The new Helen became a common courtesan and the new Eriphyle perished when her house was set on fire by her oldest son in a fit of madness. Diodorus' more sensational version, obviously not derived from Athenaeus' source Demophilus,<sup>122</sup> may have been Callisthenes.<sup>123</sup>

We have only one quotation from Callisthenes' *Sacred War*, but it is a significant one. Athenaeus<sup>124</sup> says that the greatest wars were fought on account of women. After mentioning among others the Trojan War and Helen, he quotes Duris on the Sacred War caused by the rape of the married woman Theano. It was ended after ten years with the help of Philip. The Crisaean War, too, as Callisthenes observes in his *Sacred War* (Athenaeus continues), lasted ten years and arose out of the seizure of the Phocian Megisto and the daughters of the Argives by the people of Cyrrha.

Now why would Callisthenes mention the Crisaean War and its causes in writing about the Sacred War which took place nearly

<sup>120</sup> Athen. 6.22 (232D). The thirtieth book was the one written by Ephorus' son Demophilus about the Phocian War, and was also published separately.

<sup>121</sup> 16.64. Much like Diodorus is Phylarchus, as we have seen (p. 40). There are enough differences to make Phylarchus (whom Diodorus never mentions) an unlikely source.

<sup>122</sup> At least it seems obvious to me, but there has been much discussion; cf. K. Uhlemann, *Untersuchungen über die Quellen . . . im 16. Buche Diodors* (Strassburg, 1913) 41ff.

<sup>123</sup> Diyllus is another possibility. It must be admitted that Diodorus mentions Callisthenes' *Hellenica* in such a way as to imply that he did not know the book on the Phocian War. The matter is too complicated and uncertain to go into here. If Laqueur's views about Diodorus' method of using sources is correct (*RE* s.v. "Timaios") then the arguments used in many earlier discussions of Diodorus' sources are invalid.

<sup>124</sup> 13.560BC.

two and a half centuries later? Obviously because he called attention to the fact, as Athenaeus does, that the Trojan, Crisaean, and Phocian Wars each lasted ten years and that women were at the bottom of all of them. We may easily surmise that Callisthenes drew many a parallel between the Trojan and Phocian Wars and treated the latter in the epic and tragic fashion which its episodes made so attractive.

All this gives a background for Cicero's suggestion. He wanted the dramatic episodes played up. Apart from details, there was a dramatic element, a plot to the plot of Catiline. The revelations of the conspiracy as presented in the third oration against Catiline, the recognition of the seal of the fatal letter, form a kind of *ἀναγνώρισις*. The third speech leads to the denouement, in the Aristotelian sense (*Poet.* 18.1455b26).

Mlle. Guillemin has rightly observed that Cicero's phrase *fortunae vicissitudines* is the equivalent of Aristotle's tragic peripaties. Even more interesting is Cicero's remark that to those witnessing (*intuentibus*; note the word: not *legentibus*) the misfortunes of others without any suffering of their own, the very pity that is aroused gives pleasure. This is quite like Aristotle's statement that the tragic poet produces pleasure out of pity and fear (*Poet.* 14.1453b12).

A parallel to Cicero's point of view is furnished by an unsuspected source: Horace, *Carm.* 2.1. Pollio is writing a history of the Civil War, i.e., writing a monograph such as Cicero wanted Lucceius to write. The similarity between the language of Cicero and Horace is close: "te reliquas res ordiri" (Cic. 2), "publicas res ordinariis" (Hor. vs. 10); "civilem coniurationem" (Cic. 2), "motum civicum" (Hor. vs. 1); "a principio enim coniurationis usque ad reditum nostrum" (Cic. 4), "Motum ex Metello consule civicum" (Hor. vs. 1); "in explicandis causis" (Cic. 4), "bellique causas" (Hor. vs. 2); and especially "temporum varietates fortunaeque vicissitudines" (Cic. 5), "vitia et modos ludumque Fortunae" (Hor. vss. 2-3). It has already been pointed out that Cicero's "fortunae vicissitudines" correspond to the Aristotelian peripaties. So do Horace's "modos ludumque Fortunae." Horace's entire phrase is quite similar to Polybius' criticism of Phylarchus (see p. 41), that he deals with the peripaties without giving the causes and turns of events (*τρόπον*). Pollio does both.

The classification of Pollio's history of the Civil War among the monographs written in tragic fashion gives particular point to

Horace's line "Paulum severae musa tragoediae desit theatris": Pollio will return to the writing of *tragedy* when he has finished his *tragic* history.<sup>125</sup>

When Livy reached the Second Punic War he felt the need of a special preface, as if he were writing a monograph on that war. In it he writes the sentence "varia fortuna belli, anceps Mars fuit," not unlike Cicero's "incipites variique casus." Whether the concept of tragic history colored Livy's account of the Hannibalic War is a question I leave untouched.

To return to Cicero. He says that if Lucceius concentrates on the one dramatic episode and character ("argumento . . . persona") the resultant history will reveal greater rhetorical embellishment ("uberiora atque ornatiores"). He realized, as Polybius did (see p. 42), that monographs inevitably tended to become more rhetorical and tragic than continuous histories. When he asks Lucceius to neglect the laws of history in a monograph, he is not in contradiction with his usual conception that truth is the first law of history (*De or.* 2.62, *Leg.* 1.4-5). In the latter passage, after remarking that in writing history truth should be the standard, he adds: "Although there are many *fabulae* in both Herodotus and Theopompus." He realizes that this standard is not always attained or attainable. Nor is he hypocritical in calling truth the first law of history. Much of the trouble comes from the lack of a suitable term for a tragic historical monograph and much lies in the definition of truth. After all, Truth can be most mendacious. Nor is all criticism of Cicero necessarily excluded from Lucceius' monograph, for Cicero expressly says that Lucceius will find fault or commend in accordance with his own judgment (4).<sup>126</sup> It is history, not encomium, that Cicero wants. When Lucceius failed him, Cicero wrote his own history and carefully differentiated it from encomium (*Att.* 1.19.10). But he did use, as he tells us

<sup>125</sup> The close relation of history and tragedy may perhaps be inferred from the fact that in February, 54 B.C., Quintus Cicero was apparently thinking of writing history (*Q.F.* 2.11.4) but by August or September was busy translating or adapting Greek tragedies (*Q.F.* 2.15.4; 3.1.13).

<sup>126</sup> The reference to finding fault is not mere lip service to historical truth if Timaeus, whose book on the Pyrrhic War Cicero cites as a precedent, was an enemy of Pyrrhus (see note 118). Later in the letter (7), when Cicero is looking for an example of praise bestowed by a historian, he mentions Themistocles in Herodotus and Timoleon—not Pyrrhus—in Timaeus. Polybius (12.23.4) asserts that Callisthenes merely wanted to deify Alexander but Timaeus made Timoleon greater than the greatest of the gods.

(*Att.* 2.1.1), Isocrates' store of perfumes as well as Aristotle's pigments. In other words, the book was intended to please, not merely to instruct. He groups history with encomia and such works as Isocrates' *Panegyric* under the head of epideictic oratory (*Or.* 37; cf. 66, 207; *De or.* 2.62; *Leg.* 1.5). This is another way of saying that Isocrates came near writing history (see above p. 28ff.). We must not forget that Cicero was an Isocratean through and through.<sup>127</sup> Therefore he wants history written after the manner of Isocrates and Theopompus (*Or.* 207).

In the *Brutus* (42-43) Cicero has Atticus say that the rhetorician may tell lies in writing histories and may employ rhetorical and tragic embellishment. But, as Boyancé observes,<sup>128</sup> Atticus says this with a smile (*ridens*). As everyone knows, if one smiles, he may say almost anything to another. The point at issue is the manner of Coriolanus' death. Cicero likes the suicide story, as it improves the parallel between Coriolanus and Themistocles, but Atticus had argued against the suicide tale. But within two years Cicero repeats this version.<sup>129</sup> To my mind, this means that he felt that absolute certainty had not been attained by Atticus. Under the circumstances he thought himself justified in choosing the version that suited his purpose. He did not invent the story himself.

We should therefore not sneer at Cicero for suggesting a violation of the laws of history as he himself formulated them soon after, for he was requesting a literary monograph, not a factual history. Nor need we excuse him, if excuse it can be called, on the ground that his political reputation had been somewhat impaired and he needed a panegyric, in other words, that the end justified the means. We should remember, too, that in antiquity it was eminently proper to ask for a place in a writer's work. It was a bit of permissible vanity,<sup>130</sup> like having a picture painted, as Cicero himself implies (7). It is just one step removed from a Who's Who or a college portrait gallery. Who are we to cast stones? Cicero availed himself of a convention (for such it clearly was) which seems to us in bad taste, a convention which, in a way, is not unlike

<sup>127</sup> Cf. H. M. Hubbell, *The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius and Aristides* (New Haven, 1913) 16ff.

<sup>128</sup> "Sur Cicéron et l'histoire" *REA* 42 (1940) 388. Cf. *adridens* in *De or.* 1.134.

<sup>129</sup> *Am.* 42, noted by H. Henze, *Quomodo Cicero de Historia Eiusque Auctoribus Iudicaverit Quaeritur* (Jena, 1899) 28. That variant accounts of Coriolanus' death were in circulation is known from Livy 2.40.10.

<sup>130</sup> Not politeness, I think, as Mlle. Guillemin suggests.

another that is strange to us, that of claiming immortality for one's literary work. This we have come to recognize and we do not hold it against Horace and a host of others who follow it.

As often remarked, the letter was carefully written, with rhetorical trimmings, including clausula rhythm. In spite of this it has some colloquial touches: perhaps *subrusticus* (1); possibly *genus* in the sense of "high class" (1); *quia* (2); *causa* for *res*—cf. French *chose*, Italian and Spanish *cosa* (2); *bene et naviter* (3); *pluscum* (3); *adsentatiuncula* (6); *gloriola* (9). Perhaps these touches counteract the formality to such an extent that we are not justified in assuming, as is sometimes done, that this letter (like other formal letters) was intended for general circulation. Cicero's remark in a letter to Atticus (4.6.4) seems to preclude such an intention: he calls the letter to Lucceius *valde bella* and suggests that Atticus get it from Lucceius. If Cicero had intended to circulate copies among his friends surely he would have sent one of the first to Atticus. We conclude that it was a carefully written but not formal letter and that the colloquial touches were deliberately introduced to give an air of informality. Cicero did not circulate copies but he had no objection to its being read by others than the recipient.<sup>131</sup> Evidently it did not occur to him that he was requesting Lucceius to do something to be ashamed of.

If Aristotle had had his way history would have become a science. Even he, however, would not have turned out histories in which each fact, great or small, would have been given equal emphasis; he would have stressed what seemed to him important and suppressed the trivial. But Isocrates, assisted by Greek tradition, triumphed over Aristotle and history became an art, a form of artistic literature, whose function it was to give pleasure to and uplift the reader. To a greater or lesser extent it was influenced by rhetoric, i.e., by literary devices. Under the hands of some a fair degree of accuracy was preserved, or at least deliberate falsehoods were avoided, while others invented to suit their whims, without suffering from any twinges of conscience. Even so one wonders whether the scientific history of today may not sometimes be quite as inaccurate, for one reason or another, as some of the rhetorical history written in antiquity, and besides that, it lacks the charm of a Herodotus or even a Theopompus.

<sup>131</sup> Cicero distinguishes between letters intended for the recipient only and those which others would read (*Fam.* 15.21.4).